In the leader piece of its January 29th, 2022 issue, the Economist writes this:
"The global order has long been buttressed by the norm that countries do not redraw other countries' borders by force of arms. when Iraq seized Kuwait in 1990, an international coalition led by America (that's how they call it - my note) kicked it out. Mr Putin, who has a nuclear arsenal at his command, has already got away with annexing Crimea".
(Russia's roulette - it's easy to find on the Economist website, but it's paywalled)
Note, en passant, that it mentions 'norms', not written treaties. But that's not the main point.
The main point is that, I think you will agree, there is a glaring omission in the passage above: Kosovo.
Serbia's borders *were* redrawn by force of arms by the NATO intervention of 1999, an intervention that did not have the UN Security Council backing.
It was the first instance in which NATO showed it had unofficially changed its policy and its raison d'etre; from defensive alliance of a very limited and specified region of the world, to an organisation that gave itself the right to intervene offensively way outside that region. I suppose that, like any big bureaucracy faced with downsizing, it had to do something to justify its existence.
So, what Putin has done in Crimea, is nothing more than what NATO did in 1999 (and that's not couting on the fact the Crimeans voted for it, we've already gone over this so no need to repeat).
You think what happened in Kosovo did not break any treaty or written rules, and therefore using it to justify Putin's action is "revisionism"? Fine. But then you will have to apply the same standard to Putin's actions in Crimea. You can't consider one 'good' and the other 'bad', like the Economist implicitly does.
[note: There is another historic parallel in this story. The ex-Yugoslavia carnage started when Germany recognised Croatia and Slovenia, despite having agreed *not* to do so at a EU summit only a couple of weeks before, and despite the UN Secreatary General of the time warning that the action would have grave consequences. So, when Putin recognised the Republics of Lugansk and Donbass, he just repeated what Germany did in Yugoslavia in 1992. Again, I don't think you can condone what Germany did and condemn what Putin did at the same time]
As for NATO expansion, no formal written treaties were ever signed; plenty of verbal assrances at the highest level were offered and reiterated (see for example:
NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard | National Security Archive).
What does this mean? It means, imho, that NATO's word is worth shit. Which, in a sense, makes Putins' case for his actions even stronger, not weaker. Because how could he trust reassurances that Ukraine would not join NATO, that it would not become a platform for lethal offensive weapon systems aimed at Russia? Do you think he could trust these promises from the same actor (NATO) that had already spectacularly broken its word once? Why do you think he insisted on a *written* agreement?
So, from the legal point of view, no treaty was broken, we agree on that. But the consequence of this is the fact that NATO cannot be considered a trustworthy partner, and this, imho, makes the world in general, and the Eurasian region in particular, much less secure. I don't think NATO in particular, and the West in general, can think of holding the moral high ground on this.
IPB